This article proposes a complementary explanation for why oil-rich economies have experienced a relative low GDP growth over the last decades: the proportion of taxes in the prices of petroleum products have been globally increasing for the four last decades, thus making oil revenues grow slower than output from manufacturing and yielding a low growth of oil-exporting countries' GDPs. This is illustrated in a two-country model of oil depletion examining why a net oil-exporting country and a net oil-importing country are dierently aected by increasing taxes on the resource use. The hypothesis is constructed on the theory of non-renewable resources taxation. The argument is based on the distributional eects of taxes on exhaustible resources, that are mainly borne by the suppliers. The theoretical predictions are not invalidated when put up against available statistics.
1

Introduction
Development economists and resource economists have advanced several complementary theories for why oil-exporting economies have experienced low growth of income. Another explanation may be provided on the basis of the literature about the taxation of exhaustible resources. The rent extraction eect of those taxes and their trend over the last decades may account for a substantial part of oil-rich economies' GDP dynamics. This is the hypothesis developed in this paper: the GDP of oil-rich countries may have decreased relatively because more and more of their rents have been captured by tax revenues of top oil-consuming countries.
The resource curse literature deals actually with the role of all kinds of natural resources, mostly non-renewable though, and does not focus exclusively on petroleum. Many scholars have supported the view that resource-abundant economies have tended to grow slower than other economies. In particular, the seminal study by Warner (1995 and ) assesses a negative relationship between the ratio of natural resource exports to GDP and economic growth. Now revisited on the basis of other measures of resource-abundance, the negative inuence of large quantities of natural resources on economic growth is still discussed (e.g. Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008) .
However, gures bear clear witness to the negative eect of large oil endowments on growth. Indeed, some of the most tremendous development failures are among oilexporting countries. Gylfason (2002) computes that, from 1965 to 1998, OPEC members experienced a per annum average 1.3% decrease in their per capita GNP, whereas lowerand middle-income developing countries as a whole grew by an average rate of 2.2% over the same period. Figure 1 illustrates this dierence in growth rates. In particular, the GNP per capita in Nigeria remained constant over this period. The rate of growth of per capita GNP was on average -1% per year in Iran and Venezuela, -2% in Libya, -3% in Iraq and Kuwait and -6% in Qatar (from 1970 to 1995 for this latter country) Figure 2 shows that many oil dependent states experienced rates of growth much lower than world average and lower-income developing countries average 2 . Some of them had very low, negative growth rates in this period. This was particularly the case for three major oil-producing countries, namely the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela.
Hence, if the curse of natural resources is a debated issue, the low growth performances of oil-exporting countries is striking. This is the reason why case studies on the latter countries have often provided illustrations of the resource curse phenomenon (e.g. Auty, 2001 , and Gylfason, 2002) .
The economics literature has formulated several kinds of explanations for the so-called curse of natural resources. Of course, these theories are not competing and it is believed that they all play some role in explaining the low economic performances of resource-rich countries. Let us mention the main classes of explanations and discuss their capability to convincingly apply to the case of oil-abundant countries. The controversial Prebisch-Singer hypothesis (Prebisch, 1950, and Singer, 1950) points to a tendency for prices of primary commodities to decline relatively to those of manufactured goods. Although this fact seems to be veried for oil prices, the tendency is generally far from settled (Sapsford, 1990 , and Kellard and Wohar, 2003) . This dynamics of relative prices would be partly explained by the increasingly competitive structure of primary sectors relative to manufacturing sectors. This seems to hardly apply to the case of oil production.
Another explanation is provided by the overshooting theory. Rodríguez and Sachs (1999) emphasize that a temporary resource boom makes an economy develop faster towards its steady state, thus experiencing slower transitional dynamics. In their model, an economy can even rise above its long term steady-state. In this case, it experiences a negative growth after the resource boom. This dynamics is somewhat exaggerated by the exogeneity of the extractive activity and the assumption that resource revenues can only be used in the form of capital, thus forcing the accumulation engine. However, this theory illustrates very convincingly that resource-abundant economies live temporarily "beyond their means" and the model approximates the Venezuelan economy's performance over its oil boom. Nevertheless, the "key assumption (...) that exports of natural resources cannot expand at the same rate as other industries" remains unexplained. The Dutch disease view supports that a natural resource boom can lead an economy to shift resources away from other sectors, possibly explaining a temporary low economic performance. The basic argument is that larger exports of natural resources entail a currency appreciation, shifting resources to the production of non-tradable goods at the expense of the production of tradable goods. If the tradable sector is more capital-intensive (Corden and Neary, 1982) or more favorable to growth in some way (In Krugman, 1987, and Matsuyama, 1992 , manufacturing features learning-by-doing), the resource-abundant economy can experience a slow capital accumulation or can lose irreversibly competitiveness in manufacturing, leading to relatively low growth even after the boom has subsided. However, one can remark that oil extraction can be a long, not permanent though, continuous activity and is, after all, comparable to manufacturing given the discovery and transformation processes it is going with (Davis and Tilton, 2005) . A simple related story is that of frictions rendering dicult to shift back resources to traditional tradable sectors after a boom.
It has been also advanced that a cause of low development in oil-rich countries relies in the concentration of identiable rents from resource-abundance. This is likely to encourage socially damaging rent-seeking behaviors (Auty, 1997) . The symptoms are manifold; they can take the form of protection, other privileges, corruption..., all contributing to the deterioration of institutions and to lower economic growth (Bardhan, 1997) .
Resource-abundance may also give people a "false sense of security" (Gylfason, 2001 ), providing governments with low incentives to adopt good economic policies. In particular, this results in relatively low openness to trade, and bureaucratic and institutional ineciencies (Sachs and Warner, 1999) . This government failure may as well explain why resource-rich countries, especially the OPEC member countries, have devoted inadequate expenditures to education (Gylfason et al., 1999, and Gylfason, 2001 ).
The present paper develops a complementary hypothesis that has never been suggested before: the proportion of taxes in the prices of petroleum products has increased substantially, thus contributing to the low GDP growth in oil-exporting countries.
The argument is based on the theory of the taxation of exhaustible resources. Since the seminal article by Hotelling (1931) , several contributions, among which Dasgupta and Heal (1979) , Dasgupta, Heal and Stiglitz (1980) and Sinn (1982) , have evoked the distributional eects of taxes (anticipated or not) on exhaustible resources. These taxes capture pure rents of the mining activity, thus transferring a part of the prots from extracting into the tax revenues of the scal authority. This is because of the rather inelastic resource supply induced by the niteness of cumulated extracted ows (Sinn, 2008) . There is no general argument about the eect of a standard commodity taxation on the exporters and the importers of the commodity. However, we shall see that when dealing with a non-renewable resource, its exhaustible character is critical. For instance, in a multi-country model where an exhaustible resource is entirely owned by one region, resource taxation results in an international transfer from the exporting-region to the importing ones. This has been examined by Bergstrom (1982) , Brander and Djajic (1983) and Daubanes and Grimaud (2006) .
Nevertheless, these papers have not drawn all the implications of the distributional eect of exhaustible resources taxation. In particular, they have not investigated how this transfer aects the GDP components of the resource-importing and the resourceexporting countries and how the dynamics of these components is altered by the variation of the resource taxes over time. Moreover, due to a lack of data on oil-products taxation at the global level, the historical trend in taxes on these products has not been assessed until now. Doing so will enable us to formulate our hypothesis.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 refers to the available empirical studies showing that the proportion of taxes in petroleum products has been rising over the last decades. Section 3 proposes a dynamic, general equilibrium, two-country (oilexporter and oil-importer) model of oil depletion. This aims at illustrating how this historical trend, taken as exogenous, has aected the GDPs of the oil-exporting and the oil-importing regions dierently. In particular, it shows that the increasing path of taxes entailed a lower GDP growth in the exporting country. Section 4 puts the intermediary theoretical prediction that oil revenues grew slower than output from manufacturing up against statistics. Moreover, some evidence is given that the eect of increasing taxes on oil products may have been of a substantial magnitude. Section 5 draws the implications of the analysis. One can encounter diculties in assessing trends in fuel taxes. This is partly due to a lack of empirical work on this issue. Let us refer here to some statistical studies. Although partial, they suggest an increase in the proportion of tax in the prices of fuel products over the last four decades.
Recent data are available for the EU15, representing 20% of world oil consumption in the early 2000s 
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Europe is one of the top oil-consuming regions but is not representative of the World as a whole. Hence, it is worth focusing on how tax rates on petroleum products have evolved at a larger scale. Gupta and Mahler (1995) provide data on regional average tax rates, as percentage of tax exclusive retail price, for ve categories of petroleum products (Premium gasoline, regular gasoline, kerosene, automotive and heavy fuel oil) in 1974 and 1990 6 . In OECD, representing more than 62% of world oil consumption in 1990 7 , the gures show a sharp increase in ad valorem tax rates on oil products between 1974 and 1990. Figure 4 illustrates these changes. Data are less readily available for non-OECD countries. However, Gupta and Mahler (1995) compute average tax rates at the continental and world levels. Figure 5 shows that the tax rates on oil products have globally increased, except for regular gasoline, whose tax rate has decreased by 1%. The tax increases are more moderate at the world level than in OECD. However, for some products, the ad valorem tax rate has risen drastically. For example, the world average tax rates on kerosene and heavy fuel oil have jumped by 71% and 166% respectively. This global increase must not hide regional disparities. In Africa and Central and South America, representing 6% of world oil consumption in 1990 8 , tax rates have in- 6 Sources: Saito (1975) , OECD (1990 OECD ( , 1991 OECD ( , 1992 , Energy Détente and authors' estimates. creased much more moderately than in OECD, whereas in Asian non-OECD member countries, representing 10% of world oil consumption in 1990 9 , they have decreased markedly. As concerns the Middle East, data are far from being complete. However, they suggest that tax rates have decreased or have remained constant 10 . Because of the specic tax components of energy prices, tax rates and proportions of tax in the prices are inuenced by the tax exclusive prices, thus being rather volatile. Taking this volatility into account would require to have more complete time series. Nevertheless, the variations noted above are marked enough to draw a reasonable conclusion about the trends in fuel taxes.
Overall, the ad valorem tax rates on oil products (or the proportions of tax in nal prices) 11 can be considered to have signicantly risen at the global scale, this increase being drastic in top oil-consuming regions. For the sake of simplicity 12 , we will assume that taxes have increased homogeneously at the world level, i.e. at the same rate in all regions.
9 Source: Energy Information Administration (2003). 10 Some data are available for Ecuador, Indonesia, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. 11 The rate of growth of the ad valorem tax rate and of the corresponding proportion of tax in the nal price have the same sign.
12 This is made in order to keep the point clear and to avoid computational diculties. We will come back later on why regionally dierentiated tax increases would not bias the results substantially. At each date t ≥ 0, the nal output Y i of each country's (i = I, E) production sector is given by the production function
where L i is the quantity of labor employed and R i the ow of resource consumed in country i. Moreover, A i is an index of labor productivity in country i and allows for a productivity gap between both countries. Technical improvement is given exogenously by the common rate of growth of labor productivities indexes 14 :
The resource is freely extracted from two stocks located in both regions:
where S i is the size of the reserves in country i and R S i the instantaneous ow extracted from country i's stock.
The preferences of both countries' innitely-lived representative households are identical and represented by the intertemporal utility functions
where C i is the consumption level of country i's households and ρ is a psychological discount rate. Households of country i are endowed with the local stock of resource S i and the constant quantity of labor L i .
Labor is immobile while the nal good and the resource extracted are freely transportable.
The world resource constraints for the resource input and the nal good are:
13 For simplicity, the time argument of each variable is dropped as long as this does not create ambiguity. 14 The derivative with respect to time of any variable X is denoted byẊ. Its rate of growth is denoted by g X =Ẋ/X. Assume there are two local labor markets on which wages are denoted by w i , a world market for the resource extracted whose producer price is denoted by p, a world market for the nal good whose price is normalized to unity and a world nancial market on which the interest rate is denoted by r.
A multiplicative tax 15 τ i > 1 is applied to the price of the resource consumed in country i, so that the unit consumer price of the resource paid by the rms located in country i is pτ i . Tax revenues of country i are then p(τ i − 1)R i . They are equally redistributed to the households of this country. These taxes grow at a given positive rate:
The optimizing behavior of households results in the Ramsey-Keynes conditions:
The prot-maximizing behavior of both extraction sectors leads to the Hotelling rule:
and to asymptotic exhaustion of both resource stocks:
These two conditions determine uniquely the world extraction path but leave indeterminate the dynamics of the local stocks and extraction rates. Let us restrict the local depletion dynamics to be balanced in the sense that the two local extraction ows evolve at the same rate. In other words, the local relative stocks will be independent of time, or equivalently, the relative supply, R S I /R S E , will be constant over time 16 . The prot-maximizing behavior of the nal sectors leads to the equalization of prices and marginal productivities: 15 The magnitude of taxes can be expressed in dierent terms. In order to be clear about how the increasing trend in taxes is introduced, it is worth mentioning what an increase in the multiplicative tax τ means. An increase in τ is equivalent to an increase in the associated ad valorem tax rate (tax rate expressed as a percentage of the tax exclusive nal price) τ − 1 and to an increase in the proportion of tax in the nal price (τ − 1)/τ . 16 This is a standard assumption of symmetry. First, this restriction is necessary for allowing a comparison of both countries' dynamics. Indeed, without it, the dynamics of resource revenues, and thus of GDPs, can be nearly everything and anything. Second, this symmetry between the depletion of the two stocks is supported by the observed strong correlation between national instantaneous supplies and estimated national remaining reserves.
where i = I, E.
The following proposition gives the dynamics of the regional economies and the split of resource extraction ows and resource consumption levels. Proposition 1 In a balanced equilibrium,
Proof of Proposition 1 See the Appendix.
Since both regional taxes, τ I and τ E , grow at the same rate, the relative local nal price of the resource remains constant. As a result, a constant fraction of the world extraction ow is used in each country. This implies that the quantities of resource used in the two countries, R I and R E , and thus the regional outputs, Y I and Y E , grow respectively at the same rates. Then, the economy is balanced in the sense that every variable grows at the same rate in both countries.
In this model of perfect foresight, the future path of taxes is anticipated correctly and inuences economic growth. The anticipated variations of the tax over time distort the path of the resource price, thus aecting the intertemporal arbitrage of the extractors. This is why the growth rate of the taxes, g τ , enters negatively in the expressions of the rate of growth of resource uses and outputs. In brief, the higher the taxes in the future, the less protable to extract later, the more the extractors will supply currently relative to in the future. This eect of anticipated future taxes is emphasized in many papers, among which Sinclair (1992), Grimaud and Rougé (2005) and Groth and Schou (2007) . This is due to perfect foresight. However, we will argue that our results are perfectly independent of this eect of anticipated taxes but on the eect of actual taxes 17 . In equilibrium, the split of the world extraction ow between the two nal sectors is determined by the equalization of marginal productivities of the resource input to its nal price in both countries respectively. As a result, the relative resource use in country I is decreasing with the relative tax in this country because the relative local price increases with the level of the local tax. Moreover, the relative resource use is increasing with the relative local eective labor quantity which locally improves, by complementarity, the productivity of the resource.
As concerns the relative resource supply in one country, it is, because of symmetric extraction, proportional to relative reserves in this country.
3.3
On the GDPs of the resource-importing and the resourceexporting countries
Among the two countries, one is a net resource-importer while the other is a net resourceexporter. Let us assume that I is the importing country and E the exporting one. Using equations (15) and (16), this amounts to assuming
Indeed, (17) can be shown to be equivalent to
Hence, the exporting country is the one endowed with large reserves relative to its quantity of eective labor, thus extracting more resource than it uses. Equipped with our main ingredients, namely an oil-importing country, an oil-exporting country and an exogenous increasing trend in taxes on oil products, we can go into the details of the GDPs' dynamics.
On the income side, the GDP of country i = I, E equals the market value of its nal output, plus the value of resource supply, minus the payment for the resource input, plus tax revenues:
where
and g pR I = g pR E , the components of the GDPs growing respectively at the same rate in both countries. Indeed, our assumptions 18 guarantee there is no sources of growth dierential between the two countries but the globally increasing trend in taxes on oil products. It is worth noting that the taxes do not appear in the previous expression of the GDPs. This is because the taxes included in the gross payment for the resource input are collected back by the local residents and thus reinjected into the GDP. Hence, in this expression, the term on the far right represents the payment for the resource use net of this tax collection.
However, the tax increase and the dierent structures of the GDP of the resource importer and of the resource exporter will result in dierent GDP growth.
The GDPs can be decomposed this way:
(<0) net payment for the resource
These expressions highlight that, beyond the value of manufacturing, the GDP of the importer is reduced by the net payment for the resource and that of the exporter is increased by the net resource revenues. Now, because of the tax increase, these two terms won't grow at the same rate as outputs. From (11) ,
Finally, this and the dierent structures of the GDPs (as expressed in (20)) lead to a dierence in GDP growth.
Proposition 2 If country E is the net resource-exporting country and country I the net resource-importing country and if taxes on oil products rise globally, then country E will experience a lower GDP growth than country I.
Proof of Proposition 2 See the Appendix.
This relies on the distributional eects of the non-renewable resource taxation. Because of the Cobb-Douglas specication of the production function, the payment for the resource input is always a constant fraction of output. From (11), pτ i R i = αY i , i = I, E. If taxes are constant, i.e. g τ = 0, then the net of the tax extractor's unit revenue pR i is also a constant fraction of output. However, if g τ > 0, pR i decreases relative to output. Why is that? Taxes are paid by the consumers but not earned by the resource producers. Because of the relative inelasticity of the resource supply entailed by the exhaustibility constraint, the taxes on oil products have little eect on the nal price (including the tax), but do aect its split between the resource suppliers and the national scal authorities. Hence, taxes on oil products are borne by the suppliers and are transferred into the government's income of the consuming region. If taxes are increasing, this partial capture of the resource rent is getting larger and larger, thus widening the gap between output from manufacturing and resource revenues. Since the resource-exporting country supplies more resource than it uses, the increasing trend in fuel taxes yields a lower growth of output in this country relative to the resource-importing country 19 . This eect depends on the asymmetric structure of the GDPs in the two countries, favoring growth in the country with relatively low reserves, at the expense of the resourcerich. Hence, relative low growth of the resource-exporting country will get worse as it is more resource-dependent. Proposition 3 The gap between the GDP rate of growth in the resource-importing country and the resource-exporting country is widening with the stock of resource in the latter region.
Proof of Proposition 3 See the Appendix. 19 In a model where taxes are imperfectly anticipated, one would still have this rent capture and the lower growth of the net exporter's GDP, thus showing that Proposition 2 has nothing to do with the assumption of perfect foresight. According to the proposed hypothesis, the eect of changes in taxes over time on GDP growth in the oil-exporting countries is borne by the dierence between the growth rates of oil revenues and output. Indeed, the model predicts that an increase in ad valorem taxes on oil results in a slower increase of rents than manufacturing output. This is a key point.
In the literature, this is the basic assumption of the overshooting theory such as formulated in Rodríguez and Sachs (1999) : "Our key assumption is that exports of natural resources cannot expand at the same rate as other industries". However, one can see from Proposition 1 that without any variation in oil taxes (g τ = 0), this does not hold (i.e. g pR S i = g Y i ) in our standard model of oil depletion. This is due in particular to the implicit assumption, resulting from the Cobb-Douglas specication, that the price elasticity of the demand for the resource is constant over time. Here, a lower growth of oil revenues compared to that of output from manufacturing requires a tax increase. The above theory thus suggests that this low growth may be a consequence from a global tax increase: oil revenues would rise at a lower rate than the value of nal output, i.e. formally, if
This intermediate implication can be confronted with the data. In the case of Venezuela, Rodríguez and Sachs (1999) nd that per capita petroleum exports have declined faster than per capita GDP over the period .
Between 1990 and 2000, OPEC net oil export revenues remained stable 20 . Over the same period, the GDP of all OPEC members grew (from 1.6% in Venezuela to 4.9% in Kuwait, per annum on average). Accordingly, the output of industry (including mining) grew faster than that of manufacturing (industry excluding mining) in 6 out of 8 countries for which data are available 21 . Over the period 1980-2004, per capita OPEC oil revenues have decreased by about 65%. At the same time, the worst performance on per capita GDP growth was that of UAE with slightly less than -50% 22 . The intermediate prediction that oil revenues grew slower than output from manufacturing is thus not invalidated. According to the observations made in Section 2, a more realistic assumption about the increases in regional taxes on oil use would allow them to dier. Indeed, the data suggest that taxes on oil products (as a proportion of the nal price) have increased more drastically in top consuming regions than in oil-producing countries, where they may have remained constant or even decreased. Hence, it would be more accurate to assume
First, the assumption that g τ I > 0 would still drive the relatively low growth in the oil-exporting region. Moreover, if g τ I > g τ E , another feature would be the widening gap between the nal prices of the resource in the two countries. This would increase the fraction of the world resource supply used in the resource-exporting country, thus, in turn, favoring growth of output in this region. Finally, at the cost of complicated computations of the unbalanced dynamics of the two-country economy, it would mitigate our result if the exporter is not suciently resource-dependent.
However, as a matter of facts, oil is largely used out of the top oil-producing countries 23 and the fraction of the total oil supply used out of these countries has remained stable since 1960 24 . It is thus reasonable to think that the presumed relatively lower increase in taxes on oil products in the top oil-exporting countries has played a marginal role on their GDP dynamics. 4.3 Expected magnitude
In the absence of any econometric analysis, one can hardly tell about the part of the low GDP growth in oil-exporting countries explained by the global increasing trend in fuel products taxes. However, the explanatory power of this hypothesis is likely to be high if the eect of this increasing trend in taxes and this trend itself are of a large magnitude. The study of the increasing trend in oil products taxes led to the conclusion that it has been rather marked at the global level and rather drastic in top oil-consuming regions. What about its eect on the GDP growth in oil exporting countries? It is expected to be high because taxes in top oil-consuming regions are very high, capturing a large part of oil revenues and because oil revenues represent usually a very large fraction of oil-exporting countries' GDPs.
Indeed, taxes on oil products constitute 6% of the total scal revenues in OECD countries 25 . Through these taxes, the G7 countries captured $517 billion per year over the period [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] , whereas annual oil revenues made by the OPEC were lower than this amount 26 . This amount is enormous relative to the OPEC countries' GDPs. For instance, if the share of Nigerian oil in the G7's consumption were identied to its share 23 The Middle-East represents 6.7% of world oil consumption. Source: Energy Information Administration (2004 The governments of oil-exporting countries acknowledge frequently that taxes in oil products aect their revenues. This is true even if the taxes are levied on the consumption of a transformed product from oil. Indeed, transformation is a standard industry, not characterized by pure rents. The rents captured by the product taxation are thus those supposed to be earned by the owners of the primary resource.
Variations of these taxes over time may thus entail far from negligible variations in the GDP of oil-dependent, oil-producing countries. 5 Concluding implications and future research Available data suggest a marked increasing trend in the proportion of tax in the nal prices of oil products over the last decades. In a two-country model of oil depletion, this trend has been shown to deteriorate the relative GDP growth in the net resourceexporting country. This occurs because globally increasing taxes on the resource use make resource revenues rise more slowly than output from manufacturing. Data conrm this key intermediate prediction.
This work thus provides a hypothesis, based on the theory of non-renewable resource taxation, for why oil-exporting countries have experienced a relatively low GDP growth over the last 40 years. It does not question the existing theories on the oil curse and is thought to be complementary.
The major implication of our hypothesis is that the dynamics of the taxes on oil products has to be controlled for when measuring the explanatory power of other factors of the resource curse. Of course, a measurement of the explanatory power of the proposed hypothesis itself needs to be implemented. However, the lack of time-series data on oil taxes at a large scale is a major obstacle, and such a study thus seems impossible in the short run. This is kept for future research.
Overall, the two above relations between g Y and r lead to r = [(1 − α)ρ + (1 − α)x − α g τ ]/(1 − α(1 − )) and to equation (13) . Using, from above, g R = g Y − r − g τ , one gets equation (14) .
Since, by (7), the growth rate of the producer price is the same for both producers, their problems are similar. However an indeterminacy in local extraction ows remains. The restriction made in Section 2 is g The GDPs, as expressed in (19) , can be rewritten, GDP i = Y i + p(R S i − R i ), i = I, E.
In this expression, the second term, representing net of tax transfers resource revenues, is positive for E and negative for I: p(R Overall, this results in g GDP E < g GDP I .
To sum up, if (17) , so that R Second, since GDP i > pR S i , i = I, E, pR S E /GDP E is increasing in R S E , in turn increasing in S E 0 . Similarly, −p(R − R S E )/GDP I is increasing in S E 0 . Finally, g GDP E − g GDP I is decreasing in S E 0 .
